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this uniform lower tax rate to a series of individual assessments, each uniform-
ly increased by a constant multiplier, yields exactly the same amount of tax
liability with respect to each assessment, disregarding any effect of tax rate
limits, as that which would be obtained by extending against each original
assessment the higher tax rate which would have resulted had the aggregate of
the original assessments been divided into the same amount of tax levy. This
would hold true no matter how the uniform multiplier had been derived and
regardless of its relation to the assessments to which it might be applied. 56
The application of any constant multiplier to each individual assessment will
magnify in an, absolute sense any disparity in individual assessments, but it
will not change the proportionate liability of one assessment to another or to
the county average. 57
The rationale of the Wasson Coal Co. case is thus equally applicable to real
or personal property assessments. The assessment issue, in any case in which it
is argued that an assessment, as equalized under the Butler Program machinery,
is in excess of full fair cash value, reduces to a question of whether the original
rather than the equalized assessment represents a fair valuation in relation to
all other original assessments in the taxing district. It would thus appear that,
had the Court of Appeals chosen to rule on the Butler Program in the Chicago
Railways case, the disposition of the case should have been the same-an in-
quiry into the facts of the original assessment.
VOTING TRUSTS UNDER THE ILLINOIS
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
Section 3oa of the Illinois Business Corporation Act permits the use of voting
trusts in the management of corporations,' but limits the duration of such trusts
56 It should be observed, however, that this identity of tax charges results only where all
assessments have been equalized by the same constant multiplier. It does not, therefore,
necessarily obtain in the case of a taxing district which overlaps two or more county boundaries
or in the relative distribution of taxes as between state-assessed and locally assessed property.
But, as has been observed, the Butler Program was designed to effect changes in just these in-
stances by eliminating the variation in average assessment levels as between counties and as
between locally assessed and state-assessed property.
57 The Full-Value Assessment Program: An Analysis of the Butler Program, a report pre-
pared by the Committee of the Ill. State's Att'ys Ass'n in collaboration with the Ill. Dept. of
Rev., at 5 (1946).
1 The constitutionality of voting trusts in Illinois is not settled. Article XI, Section 3 of
the Illinois Constitution requires that each stockholder have the right to vote for directors,
and in Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170, 1io N.E. 373 (19xS), the Illinois Supreme Court held that
voting trusts separate stock ownership from corporate control and are thus repugnant to the
constitutional provision. However, the Supreme Court in two subsequent cases distinguished
Luthy v. Ream on the grounds that there is no separation of ownership from control where a
corporation issues stock directly to voting trustees instead of to the stockholders who then
confer them upon the trustees. Rittenberg v. Mumighan, 381 Ill. 267, 44 N.E. 2d 9r3 (1942);
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to "a period of not to exceed ten years." 2 By providing a means for voting stock
as a unit large enough to control a corporation, voting trusts are potentially
both useful and harmful. They may assure the retention of expert manage-
ment and provide stability demanded by prospective creditors, but they also
weaken stockholder control over management. 3 Section 3oa represents the legis-
lative conclusion that voting trusts of limited duration are not so harmful as to
justify restriction on freedom of contract.
Practical application of the section will require clarification of the effect and
definition of an excessively long trust. The language of Section 3oa, legalizing
trusts which do not exceed ten years, fails to specify whether an excessively
long trust is to be invalidated entirely or only for the period beyond ten years.4
In resolving this ambiguity, the courts will be faced with a variety of clauses
limiting trust durations. A trust of indefinite duration (such as one created for
the life of A) will present a problem only if the courts decide entirely to invali-
date overly long trusts. The statutory language may well permit the courts to
uphold such a trust until it becomes certain that it will not actually terminate
within the prescribed period. Under either view of the effect of excessive length,
difficulties are raised by trusts which are limited to ten years or less but are
renewable upon the happening of some condition. The simplest example is a
trust to last for ten years unless the trustees, in their sole discretion, decide to
extend it. Since this would give the trustees and those they actually represent
complete control over the trust's duration, this trust should be treated like one
created to last indefinitely. Many trust agreements subject the trustees' deter-
mination to ratification by the beneficiaries, requiring either affirmative ap-
proval by a certain percentage of the certificate holders or else the absence of
a specific percentage of dissents. The effectiveness of this control is questionable
Babcock v. Chicago Rys. Co., 325 Ill. 16, 155 N.E. 773 (1927). The tenuous nature of this dis-
tiunction indicates that the court may overrule Luthy v. Ream in an appropriate future case.
The Validity of Stockholders' Voting Agreements in Illinois, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 64o (1936).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 32, § 157.3oa provides, "Any number of shareholders of a corpora-
tion may create a voting trust for the purpose of conferring upon a trustee or trustees the right
to vote or otherwise represent their shares, for a period of not to exceed ten years, by entering
into a written voting trust agreement specifying the terms and conditions of the voting
trust, and by transferring their shares to such trustee or trustees for the purposes of the agree-
ment."
3 The control which shareholders surrender by entering into a voting trust is the right to
elect orvote against directors and tovetovarious extraordinarytransactions.BallantineVoting
Trusts, Their Abuses and Regulation, 21 Tex. L. Rev. 139 (942). Realistically, the surrender
of this right in large corporations is not a serious loss. Berle and Means, The Modem Corpora-
tion and Private Property, c. v. (1947).
4 There is authority for making the choice of the alternatives depend on the nature of the
law prior to the enactment of a voting trust limitation. If voting trusts were valid at common
law, then the effect of their exceeding the statutory period should be to cut down the duration
to the proper length. If they were invalid independently of the statute, then their exceeding
it should invalidate them entirely. 38 Col. L. Rev. 5o8 (1938), noting Perry v. Missouri-
Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del. Ch. 33, 191 AUt. 823 (1937). This approach would be difficult in
Illinois where the validity of voting trusts has never been entirely certain.
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in view of the familiar apathy of stockholders in corporate voting. Thus an
agreement permitting the trustees to extend unless 95 per cent of the benefici-
aries object within a limited time would in practice be identical with a provision
for extension based on the trustees' sole discretion. Similarly, where ratification
is by affirmative approval the trustees can always count on the tendency of
stockholders to go along with management. Requirements for a lower percent-
age of objectors or a higher proportion of affirmations may furnish a more
realistic basis for beneficiary ratification. But the statute's ten-year limitation
is not so phrased that the courts can vary its applicability according to the
degree of control the beneficiaries have over the trustees. Although it is ques-
tionable whether the courts will hold limited but renewable trusts void ab initio,
it seems likely that extensions will be held invalid.
Nothing in the wording of the statute, however, prevents some or all of the
beneficiaries from creating a new trust on the expiration date of the old. 5 And
in many cases, instead of going through the formality of regaining their shares
and again conferring them upon trustees, the beneficiaries who want a new
trust may agree to extend the old one. Whether the courts will construe such
an act of extension as equivalent to an act creating a new trust depends on the
nature of the trust agreement's requirements for extension. If the trustees may
extend subject to ratification by the beneficiaries' failure to object, permitting
an extension would seem contrary to the statutory language and policy. For
recognizing a duty of the beneficiaries to speak would give legal significance to
the trust,.agreement and the relationships created thereby for a period beyond
ten yearsdW'ere affirmative votes are required, the assenters have manifested
a desire to have trustees continue to vote their shares. However, in Russ v.
Blair,6 where an extension of a voting trust not subject to Section 3oa was
held contrary to the trust agreement, the Illinois Supreme Court did not con-
sider whether the assenters' affirmative votes could create a new trust as to
them alone. And in consolidating this case with another in which an extension
was based on the absence of dissents, 7 the court failed to distinguish the situ-
ations.
By contrast, the concurring opinion in the Ohio case of Bechtel v. Rorick8
would only give effect to a purported extension by binding the assenting bene-
ficiaries to a new trust. Further illustrating this approach, a Delaware statute
which limits the duration of voting trusts contains a provision permitting as-
senting beneficiaries to continue a trust.9 An objection to the Delaware and
Ohio viewpoint is that an assenter may not want to participate in a new or
s The statute limits only the duration of a trust, not the shareholders' right to create it.
"Any number of shareholders of a corporation may create a voting trust ... for a period of
not to exceed ten years .... "flL. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 32, § 157.3oa.
6 330 Ill. App. 571, 71 N.E. 2d 838 (i947).
7 Olson v. Rosseter, 399 Ill. 232, 77 N.E. 2d 652 (1948).
s 65 Ohio App. 455, 464, 30 N.E. 2d 45r, 455 (1939) -
9 Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 2050.
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extended trust unless it is likely to retain corporate voting control. The courts
can remedy this difficulty by permitting the beneficiary to revoke if the trust
does not maintain formal control. Or perhaps, in view of the occasional need
for extraordinary majorities in ratifying corporate acts, the courts should not
recognize a new trust unless the extension solicitations have expressly warned
the beneficiaries of this consequence.
A more serious problem is that assents to an extension may result from a
mistaken approval of the trustees' conduct by misled or poorly informed share-
holders. When the voting trustees seek approval of an extension, they are under
a fiduciary duty to make full disclosure of material facts to the certificate
holders. 10 However, the protection thus afforded cannot always be relied upon.
If some of the beneficiaries rather than the trustees organize an extension,
there may be no duty to disclose." Again, enforcement of the duty depends
on the alertness of the beneficiaries and their willingness to undertake litigation.
Finally, there are no definitive cases setting forth the substantive requirements
for full disclosure in connection with extensions.12 To remedy this, the legis-
lature could adopt full disclosure requirements13 and possibly set up an admin-
istrative agency to enforce them. Yet the disclosure problems in voting trust
extensions are neither so unique nor so difficult that the legislature would be
justified in singling out this area of the law for special treatment.
The analysis of Section 3oa is incomplete without reference to a recent Illi-
nois case. In Plast v. Metropolitan Trust Co.,'4 which involved a business
trust, the trust agreement required termination "in any event" within
ten years, and it gave the trustees a power of sale. Before the expiration of the
period, the trustees organized and took control of a corporation which was
to "purchase" the trust property, exchanging one share of its stock and one of
its income bonds for each certificate of interest in the old trust. The stock,
however, was to be deposited in a voting trust under unchanged control.
10 Olson v. Rosseter, 330 I. App. 304, 71 N.E. 2d 556 (1947); Russ v. Blair, 330 Ill. App.
57', 71 N.E. 2d 838 (1947); see Shapiro v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 328 Ill. App. 65o, 66
X.E. 2d 731 (1946).
"The Illinois Appellate Court has held that the beneficiaries of a voting trust are not in a
fiduciary relationship with each other and owe each other no duty of disclosure in self-dealing.
Krensky v. De Swarte, 335 Ill. App. 435, 82 N.E. 2d i68 (1948). If applied to voting trust
extensions, this doctrine would permit the trustees to evade their disclosure duties by secretly
inducing a beneficiary to organize the extension. Such collaboration, however, is ordinarily a
breach of the trust duties of both the frustee and the beneficiary. r Bogert, Trusts and Trus-
tees § x91 (1935). The Krensky case should either be overruled or held inapplicable to ex-
tensions.
2The Illinois cases have recognized a duty to disclose but have not defined the disclosure
necessary for extensions. Cases cited note i supra.
13The legislative definition might require information of the following matters: (i) re-
vocability of the trust, (2) parties whom the trustees or other solicitors actually represent as
agents, (3) the corporate interest of the trustees and other key persons, (4) compensation of
the trustees, and (5) financial statements.
14 401 Ill. 302, 82 N.E. 2d 15 (1948).
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In approving this deal as a "sale" within the meaning of the agreement, a ma-
jority in the Illinois Supreme Court ignored the transaction's manifest purpose
-continuation of control in the hands of the same trustees.' 5 Since the pro-
vision for termination in any event within ten years is analagous to Section
3oa's ten-year limit, the Supreme Court's failure to invalidate the arrange-
ments of the Plast case sets up spurious sales as the pattern for circumventing
the statutory prohibition. However, a greater awareness of the actual objec-
tives of such transactions might result in rejection of the Plast case. It could,
moreover, be distinguished from cases under Section 3oa because its time limi-
tation was contractual.
AN AMERICAN LEGAL DILEMMA-PROOF
OF DISCRIMINATION
The control of discrimination through legal sanctions is a two-fold process:
(i) the enactment of anti-discrimination measures; (2) the enforcement of
these measures. While in the past primary emphasis has been given the former,
with the passage of anti-discrimination laws in a growing number of states, the
enforcement factor is of an immediate and growing importance., Essential to
the enforcement process is proof of discrimination in individual cases. It may
well be that in a large sense the success or failure of combating discrimination
through legal devices will ultimately depend upon the evidentiary proof which
can be achieved in individual cases.
While effective enforcement demands proof of discrimination in individual
cases, that an act has been discriminatory is not in all cases susceptible of clear
and certain demonstration. Thus if the requirements of proof are made too
rigorous, effective enforcement will not be achieved. On the other hand, lax
requirements of proof may result in erroneous findings of discrimination and
in unjustified limitations of free choice. At both the enactment and the enforce-
ment stages in the legal control of discrimination the ideal of equality, upon
which anti-discrimination measures are based, is in conflict with the equally
fundamental ideal of free choice. When an anti-discrimination law is enacted
it has been decided that the societal demands of equality justify a certain limi-
tation on free choice. But that limitation of free choice which results from an
erroneous finding of discrimination is not justified by the legislation.2 Because
15 Contrast the dissenting opinion of Judge Gunn, ibid., at 317, 162.
x For example FEP Acts: N.Y. Executive Law (McKinney, Supp. 1948) C. 23, §§ 125-36;
Conn. Gen. Stat. (i949) §§ 7400-7; i Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 1948) c. 6, § 56; N.J. Rev. Stat.(Supp. r937) tit. 18, C. 25, §§ 1-28; N.M. S. 45, z9th Assemb., Reg. Sess. (March i7, 1949);
R.I. H. 539, Gen. Assemb. 1949, Reg. Sess. (April 1, 1949); Ore. S. 235, 45th Assemb., Reg
Sess. (March 21, 1949); Wash. S. 12, 21st Assemb., Reg. Sess. (March i9, 1949). Housing: il.
Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 671, § 82; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, Supp. 1947) § 48-85o3(b); Pa. Stat. Ann.
(Purdon, 1949) tit. 35, § 1711(8). For an extensive bibliography see Graves, Anti-Discrimina-
tion Legislation in the American States (1948).
2 The limitation of free choice and the dangers of an erroneous judgment are not, of course,
unique with anti-discrimination measures. The outlawing of any action will serve to limit free
